Constitutional Law—Compulsion to Testify After Immunity Has Geen Granted by Buffalo Law Review
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 10 Number 1 Article 27 
10-1-1960 
Constitutional Law—Compulsion to Testify After Immunity Has 
Geen Granted 
Buffalo Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Buffalo Law Review, Constitutional Law—Compulsion to Testify After Immunity Has Geen Granted, 10 
Buff. L. Rev. 97 (1960). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol10/iss1/27 
This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
from raising it on appeal. Had the defendant so alerted the trial court, the
trial judge, under Section 450 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,4 0 could
have removed any doubt by polling the jury. The Court expressed some
doubt whether Section 433 even applied to Courts of Special Sessions-but
assuming that it did, the defendant was not allowed to raise the objection for
the first time on appeal. There is long standing support that a poll of the jury
is nof a matter of absolute right.4' The right to poll the jury may be waived
either expressly, or by acts or failure to act. Section 450 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure provides that, upon the rendition of the verdict, the jury
may be polled at the instance of either party, but the application of the statute
has come to require that, in order for there to be a valid poll the request must
be timely or the defendant will be assumed to have waived the right.42 Reliance
by the defendant on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to The United
States Constitution would not change the result because the Fifth Amendment
operates exclusively on federal courts and any right to poll a jury is not an
element of due process which could be said to be guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The failure of a trial court to poll the jury is not a denial of
any fundamental, constitutional right owed to a defendant; and the right to
poll may be waived by a failure to request it before the recording of the
verdict.
43
Proceedings in Courts of General Sessions outside the metropolitan area
of New York City are governed- by Part 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
Sections 699-740C inclusive and Section 714 which states in substance that
when a jury have reached a verdict, they must deliver it publicly to the court
which must enter it in its minutes. These sections make no provision requiring
that the names of jurors be called.4" The decisions of the Court of Appeals
point out the necessity of the defendant to make his objection in the lower
court upon the jury's return or else he will preclude himself from raising this
issue upon appeal.
COMPULSION TO TESTIFy AFTER ImruNiTY HAS BEEN GRANTED
The New York Constitution provides that "no person . . . shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."45 Because of this
constitutional privilege, a prospective defendant, or one who was a potential
target of an investigation, could not be constitutionally subpoenaed and sworn
before a grand jury, andif he was subpoenaed he could not be held in contempt
40. Code of Crim. Proc. § 450:
When a verdict is rendered and before it is recorded the jury may be polled, on
the requirement of either party; in which case they must be severally asked
whether it is their verdict....
41. Reed v. Cook, - Misc. -, 103 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
42. People v. Schneider, 154 App. Div. 203, 139 N.Y. Supp. 104 (2nd Dep't 1912).
43. Warner v. New York Central Railroad, 52 N.Y. 437, 11 Am. R. 724 (1873).
44. People v. Albro, 8 Misc. 2d 670, 172 N.Y.S.2d 175 (County Ct. 1957).
45. N.Y. Const. Art. 1, § 6.
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for claiming his constitutional privilege and refusing to testify. If he did
testify, and an indictment based on his testimony resulted, the indictment had
to be dismissed because he had been forced to bear witness against himself.
This was true even though he failed to claim his constitutional privilege. But
a witness in a proceeding directed against others, might be constitutionally
subpoenaed, and if he gave any incriminating testimony without claiming his
privilege, the testimony could later form the basis for an indictment.40
However with the passage of immunity statutes, the law changed so that a
prospective defendant could be constitutionally subpoenaed and forced to
testify under pain of criminal contempt. As before, a potential defendant ob-
tained automatic immunity from indictment based on any incriminating testi-
mony he might give, even though he did not claim his constitutional privilege.
Some courts held that a mere witness also obtained automatic immunity, and
that if he refused to testify he might be held in contempt.
47
In 1953, Section 2447 of the penal law was passed which proposed to
change the procedure by requiring a person to claim his privilege, be directed
to answer, and then testify in order to obtain immunity. The import of this
section is to eliminate automatic immunity by requiring the witness to first
claim his constitutional privilege in order to obtain immunity. In People v.
De Feo48 the Court of Appeals implied that Section 2447 could not consti-
tutionally be applied to prospective defendants and this implication was trans-
formed into a holding in People v. Steuding,49 where the Court said that the
right against self-incrimination is automatically conferred by the Constitution
and cannot be curtailed by statute.. Implicit in the Steuding case is the decision
that if a witness fails to claim his privilege, he is deemed to have waived it.
However, a prospective defendant may never be held to have waived his
privilege by failing to invoke it. Thus the law of the State as to prospective
defendants is the same as it was before the enactment of Section 2447 of the
Penal Law.
The decision in In re Second Additional Grand Jury (Cioffi),r ° that a wit-
ness who has been granted immunity may not refuse to testify, and if he does
so refuse, he is guilty of criminal contempt, renders the law the same on this
point as it was before the enactment of Section 2447. In this case the Grand
jury, investigating alleged unlawful solicitation of legal business, informed the
defendants that they were being called as witnesses only and were not pro-
spective targets of the investigation. The defendants claimed their consti-
tutional privilege, were granted immunity according to Section 2447, continued
46. People v. Ferola, 215 N.Y. 285, 109 N.E. 500 (1915); People v. Gillette, 126 App.
Div. 665, 111 N.Y. Supp. 133 (lst Dep't 1908); People v. Bermel, 71 Misc. 356, 128 N.Y.
Supp. 524 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
47. People v. Breslin, 306 N.Y. 294, 118 NE.2d 108 (1954); Coyle v. Truesdell,
259 App. Div. 282, 18 N.Y.S.2d 947 (2d Dep't 1940).
48. 308 N.Y. 595, 127 N.E.2d 592 (1955).
49: 6 N.Y.2d 214, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1959).
50. 8 N.Y.2d 220, 203 N.Y..2d 841 (1960).
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to claim their privilege and were adjudged guilty of criminal contempt. The
Court of Appeals held that the defendants were guilty of criminal contempt
and that had they answered the questions of the Grand Jury they would have
obtained total immunity against any prosecution as to matters disclosed by
the testimony, except for perjury or contempt.
The Cioffi decision is based on the assumption that the defendants were
summoned as witnesses only, but even if the defendants could be considered
potential targets of the investigation, the decision in the instant case would
probably have been the same. The Steuding51 case holds that a potential de-
fendant does not have to claim his privilege in order to get immunity from
indictment based on incriminating testimony he might give; but the case does
not refer to contempt proceedings for failure to testify when he has obtained
immunity. Since the defendant is accorded automatic immunity, there is no
reason for him to refuse to testify since he would not be bearing witness against
himself, and a contempt proceeding for refusal to testify is proper.
It has been consistently said that the immunity granted must be as broad
as the privilege of silence which is destroyed.52 In People v. De Feo53 the
Court of Appeals decided that the immunity conferred under Section 2447
was not co-extensive with the constitutional protection against self-incrimination
because the grand jury limited the immunity to specific crimes, and as a result
the conviction of criminal contempt could not stand. However, when, as in In
re Cioffi, 54 Section 2447 is properly used it grants complete immunity, and is
sufficiently broad to protect against prosecution of all violations of the laws
of New York State.
ATTORNEY'S REFUSAL TO TESTIFY AT INQUIRY INTO UNETHICAL PRACTICES
GROUND FOR DISBARIMENT
After ordering a "Judicial Inquiry and Investigation" into the unethical
practices of certain attorneys,55 the Appellate Division disbarred the appellant
when he failed to answer relevant questions at the inquiry.55 The appellant
maintained that the disbarment order violated his privilege against self-incrim-
ination under Article 1 Section 6 of the New York Constitution. The issue
presented to the Court of Appeals in the case of In re Cohen57 was whether the
constitutional privilege against self-incriminati6n, which protects one against
criminal prosecution, also protects one from disciplinary action as a member of
the bar for failing to answer questions at a judicial inquiry. The Court of
Appeals55 affirmed the disbarment of the Appellate Division.
51. Supra note 49.
52. Matter of Doyle, 257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489 (1931).
53. Supra note 48.
54. Supra note 50.
55. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 90.
56. 9 A.D.2d 436, 195 N.YS.2d 990 (2d Dep't 1959).
57. 7 N.Y.2d 488, 199 N.YS.2d 658 (1960).
58. Ibid.
